By William R. Dodson
Cases in which national
governments had muffed the implementation of change management came to my
attention during the summer of 2002. In both Bosnia and Japan, the governments
could have saved literally millions of dollars and thousands of person-hours if
they had only considered ahead of time the impact of the changes on their
employees and the citizens of their provinces. Each government should have –
could have – taken steps that corporations around the world are becoming
cognizant of to reduce the level of anxiety and disorientation end-users of
government IT projects would experience, and increase the likelihood citizens
would embrace the changes.
I received a phone call
some weeks ago from consultancy that had helped develop a large-scale
information technology (IT) system for the Bosnian government. The U.S. Aid
Agency had funded the project. The programming was complete. The representative
from the consultancy – a young woman in her early to mid-twenties – explained
to me that the various “cantons” or provincial governments throughout Bosnia
did not want to use the system the central government had developed.
She was looking for a
“technical” project manager, someone who could go out into the field to explain
how the system worked so that the provincial governments would think it was in
their best interest to invest themselves in the system. “They don’t trust each
other,” the woman said, “they don’t want to share information.”
“Then clearly you need a
change management consultant,” I said cheerily. “They need convincing that the
system will work in their best interests. This is not a technical problem, it’s
a trust problem.”
The Japanese case was more
expansive since it involved the central administrative government, the
law-making body – the Diet – the provincial governments and the citizenry. The
provincial administrators awoke one morning with the directive from central
government to roll-out the new computer system that would use a new national
identity number, unique for each citizen. The number would be the key field
upon which governments would be able to enter personal information about
citizens. The data was currently kept in archives stacked with paper.
Japanese citizens and
provincial mayors surprised the central government and the world by protesting
the implementation. They would have none of it. Not only would the number make
it easier for governments to track the activities of citizens, but there were
no laws on the books – let alone enforcement – protecting citizens privacy. The
Diet had chosen not to address the privacy legislation that had come across the
debate floor.
Both the Bosnian and
Japanese governments lacked credibility with their projects and the trust of
the constituencies each claimed to support. Build trust and they develop
credibility in the process. With credibility the governments can say, “Trust
us, we’re doing this in your best interest.”
For example, I felt the
lamb the consultancy wanted to throw to the provincial Bosnian wolves had to
develop trust on a personal level with key personalities in the local
governments. I told the junior consultant, “Bosnians speak a dialect of the
Turkish language, because they were part of the Ottoman Empire for a couple
hundred years. I speak Turkish and spent quite some time in Turkey. That’ll
help me establish a relationship with the people. That’ll help establish the
trust you need with them so they’ll at least take a look at the system. If they
feel they can trust you, then they’ll take that leap and take a peek. From
there, you need to understand what they require on a canton-by-canton basis:
what are their concerns, their anxieties; what benefits they are looking for.
Help them see just how the system will help them realize their goals.”
A similar approach applies
to the Japanese government. It was clear to the central government that the
country required an automated solution to a manual nightmare. The government
also knew its citizens would demand a sense of protection from information
vultures. However, the government chose to patronize its constituents, ignore
and then be-little their concerns. The best the government can hope for now is
an implementation without end, since the wave of resistance the people
presented is of tsunamic proportions. Passing and enforcing privacy laws will
help begin turn the tide.
In corporate-speak we call
trust-building “stakeholder alignment.” That is, change managers need to help
end-users of corporate implementations trust that executive management knows
what it’s doing and that efforts are indeed for the good of the constituency.
Government needs to do the
same as well. Across local governments; across constituencies; for all its
citizens – its most sacred trust.
William R. Dodson is Managing Director of Silk Road Communications,
L.L.C., a management consultancy that develops and positions products and
people for success in international markets. He is the contributing editor on
international business to the American Management Association’s (AMA) MWorld
Journal of Management, and writes the weekly column “The Cultured Business”,
found at www./ and at the Global
Perspectives section of the AMA’s member website. He can be reached at contactus@/ or +1 (847)722-7817.